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Introduction to “New Governance and
the Business Organization”
Special Issue of Law and Policy
CRISTIE FORD and MARY CONDON
SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES OF THIS SPECIAL ISSUE
The point of departure for this exciting collection of articles is to advance the
scholarly treatment of “new governance” by shifting its focus away from
what regulators do or how they do it, and towards examining the encounter
between new governance and business organizations, within those organiza-
tions themselves.1 As is evident from this issue, this shift still provides a broad
canvas on which to work, as the types of business activity examined here
through the lens of new governance encompass railways, food safety, corpo-
rate privacy, and bank lending, as well as securities and derivatives trading.
A particular strength of the articles in this issue is the presentation of original
empirical research, ranging from surveys of business in the UK food sector
(Hutter) and a case study of corporate restructuring (Sarra) to interviews
with privacy officers (Bamberger and Mulligan), bankers (Conley and
Williams), and corporate monitors (Ford and Hess). While most of the
papers focus on specific domestic contexts for business activity, Conley and
Williams’ paper is pitched at the global take up of the Equator Principles
for project lending, and Ford and Hess comment on comparisons between
Canada and the United States in the implementation of corporate monitor-
ship programmes.lapo_349 449..458
The editors of this issue are committed to the idea that the analysis of new
governance needs to move beyond theory into practice and implementation.
Accordingly, we do not engage in an exhaustive description of the contours
of the phenomenon in this introduction. We also do not engage with the
distinctions between discrete versions of new governance or between new
governance and related regulatory approaches. Much of this mapping has
been ably undertaken elsewhere (see, e.g., Gilad 2010; Wisconsin Law Review
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2010; de Búrca and Scott 2006, 2007). What is relevant for our purposes is the
broad agreement in the literature around several elements central to new
governance. The first is a restructured and more collaborative relationship
between the state and regulated entities, based on the recognition that regu-
lation may operate most effectively when it incorporates private actors’
context-specific experience and relevant expertise (Freeman 1997; Grabosky
1995), as well as potentially the experience and expertise of other nonstate
actors (Parker 2002). This may extend to public recognition and enforceabil-
ity of “rules” developed by nonstate actors (Meidinger 2006; Ayres and
Braithwaite 1992). Second, new governance imagines giving regulated enti-
ties greater autonomy to design their own internal processes to meet broadly
defined outcomes (Lobel 2004; Coglianese and Lazer 2003). This freedom
is counterbalanced by mechanisms designed to force transparency and
accountability. Specifically, the articles in this issue connect to new gover-
nance from the particular vantage point of business organizations’ compli-
ance functions, internal governance mechanisms, and/or self-regulation. New
governance has special relevance to such functions because it envisions a
dynamic and endogenously developed understanding of governance and
compliance (Ford 2008). The focus on developing regulatory strategies that
place responsibility on organizations for their own compliance, and that try
to foster or engage with authentic compliance-supporting internal motiva-
tions, is of central importance to the current project.
Third, the theoretical new governance approach emphasizes problem-
solving and experimentation in the ongoing design of regulatory strategies
(Sabel and Simon 2004; Sparrow 2000). Moreover, because of our preoc-
cupation with implementation, this issue has a particular affinity with the
most explicitly pragmatic, learning-by-doing versions of new governance,
notably experimentalism (Dorf and Sabel 1998). Finally, some new gover-
nance and related scholarship incorporates broader emancipatory, demo-
cratic, or neorepublican concerns (Shearing and Wood 2003; Dorf and
Sabel 1998; Ayres and Braithwaite 1992). While that more ambitious
agenda is not fully engaged here, broad stakeholder participation and
“voice” is a fourth theoretical underpinning, essential to both legitimacy
and effectiveness, and it is touched on in some form by all of the authors
in this issue.
The authors each take as his or her point of departure a specific set of
features of new governance in which they ground their specific analyses. For
example, while Hutter emphasizes the decentralization of regulation and
changing notions of the degree to which the regulated are held responsible for
developing internal governance processes, both Bamberger and Mulligan, as
well as Ford and Hess, foreground the revisability and experimentation
aspects of new governance thinking. It is possible therefore that, as some
argue, the definition of new governance itself is constituted and reconstituted
during evolving interactions among organizations around specific gover-
nance mechanisms (Huising and Silbey 2009).
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Another reason for the focus in this issue on understanding the imple-
mentation of new governance ideas is that the global financial crisis of
2007–2009 arguably exposed some shortcomings both in regulatory
capacity and in financial firms’ willingness to self-monitor towards the
end of systemic stability. The articles presented in this issue provide a
vantage point for a more nuanced assessment of the possibilities and limits
of new governance going forward. We note the interesting diversity of
views, ranging from scepticism to cautious optimism, ultimately expressed
in these articles concerning the continued salience of new governance
approaches after the crisis. The articles presented here individually contain
rich seams of analysis bearing on the question of the extent to which,
and how, new governance becomes embedded in a variety of organizational
locations. However, a number of cross-cutting themes may also be
identified.
I. STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS FOR THE EMERGENCE OF NEW
GOVERNANCE PROCESSES
In its own way, each article recognizes that background conditions impact
the way in which new governance processes get implemented, which may
point towards the ultimate success or failure of such initiatives. Some itera-
tions of the new governance literature derive from the idea of “regulatory
capitalism,” that is, the proposition that regulation has adopted a middle
road between pure state service provision and extensive deregulation,
pushing the state to adopt a facilitative and cooperative stance towards
business in regulating its activities (Levi-Faur 2005, 2009). In an article
originally presented at the conference that sparked this special issue,
Christine Parker (2009) argued that new governance style “enforceable
undertakings,” or corporate monitorships, are a logical consequence of
regulatory capitalism’s need to navigate around the “traps” of potentially
ill-fitting compliance strategies and potentially ill-fitting deterrence ones.
Meanwhile, Hutter identifies a shift away from a controlling and towards a
“constitutive” conception of regulatory action with respect to business
activity (Shearing 1993). She also pays attention to the specifics of industry
structure (how many sophisticated organizations, how many small actors)
as relevant conditions for the uptake of new governance initiatives.
Ford and Hess tease out the notion of “organizational culture” (including
fears of liability and patterns of expertise-based homogeneity) as both a
motivation for the creation of corporate monitorships in the first place
and, ultimately, an obstacle to their success (as Ford and Hess define
success). Finally, Conley and Williams acknowledge that the difficulties
of imposing command-and-control–type regulation on multinational
companies are part of the landscape in which the Equator Principles have
flourished.
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II. RISK MANAGEMENT AS NEW GOVERNANCE
In a number of these articles, risk management emerges as an overarching
form of new governance, involving as it does a shift away from a preoccu-
pation with compliance with external legal norms and towards an enterprise
of containing and managing risks to an organization emanating from a
variety of sources (including, of course, the risk of various legal liabilities).
Condon has noted that the scholarship on risk regulation and that on new
governance has tended not to extensively converge; the articles in this issue
are emerging examples of that valuable cross-pollination (Condon 2007).
Accordingly, Hutter’s article most explicitly recognizes both risk regulation
and the risk management responses of organizations as forms of new gover-
nance, while her empirical research demonstrates the difficulties of actually
implementing risk management strategies throughout even sophisticated
organizations. Bamberger and Mulligan frame their discussion of emerging
corporate practices around privacy in terms of the increasingly pervasive
understanding of privacy “as a risk to be managed rather than a matter of
legal compliance.” In contrast to Hutter, their research points to an optimis-
tic outcome whereby the “integration of privacy into existing decision
making structures . . . promotes privacy’s consideration as a systemic risk,
consistent practices across firm units, and the commitment of employees
from across the firm” (p. 504).
Meanwhile, Conley and Williams are cautiously optimistic about the pro-
gressive role to be played by the market-based Equator Principles as a form
of quasi-regulation, in large part because adherence to these principles allows
lending banks to manage their own financial risks. Finally, Sarra considers
the increasing use of equity derivatives by financial market participants, in
terms of the implications of that trading strategy for traditional understand-
ings of the rationale for shareholder “voice” in corporate decision-making.
To the extent that entering into derivatives transactions is an exercise in
risk management for those shareholders, Sarra’s article suggests that share-
holders are increasingly signalling that derivatives transactions are a more
effective market-based strategy for risk management than the capacity to
exercise “voice” in corporate decision making. More generally, however, an
increasing focus on risk management as a strategy of governance in business
organizations raises difficult issues about who will ultimately be able to
participate in governance processes, since risk management has been con-
ceived in the academic literature as a process that privileges technocratic and
“expert” knowledge (Power 2007; Beck 1992).
III. AGENCY, VOICE, AND EXPERTISE IN NEW GOVERNANCE
The articles in this issue deal with a cluster of issues revolving around where
agency for new governance initiatives is or is not located in organizational
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contexts. A related issue, mentioned above, is charting the significance of
particular bodies of “expertise” in implementing or shaping such initiatives.
Hutter’s article contains a valuable assessment of different stakeholders’
relative agency within the food safety sector. Interestingly, her research on
that sector in the UK domestic context did not accord much agency to
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as an influence on business prac-
tices. This is in contrast to Conley and Williams’ article, which accords high
significance to the role of environmental NGOs as a factor in pushing finan-
cial institutions to adopt the Equator Principles into their lending practices.
Ford and Hess describe the corporate monitorship process as one in which
the corporate entity seeks to retain as much agency as possible over the scope
of the work conducted by the monitors, though their dissatisfied view of the
outcomes to date is ultimately connected to the lack of enthusiasm they find
among ex-prosecutor corporate monitors to achieve expansive goals.
Meanwhile, Sarra’s article spans several different locations for addressing
questions of agency in new governance: her case study of the Algoma Steel
corporate restructuring and her analysis of the role of equity derivatives in
corporate governance. With respect to the former, she finds the capacity of
the corporation’s employees to exercise agency in that restructuring to be
partial and contingent. With respect to the latter, she ultimately locates
agency for corporate governance outcomes in the market innovation of
equity derivatives themselves. Finally, while Bamberger and Mulligan focus
primarily on internal actors (privacy officers) as agents of change in the
privacy context, they also see a significant role for the “activist regulator” in
promoting the responsibilization of these internal change agents.
A recurring theme is scepticism about the possibilities for broad citizen
involvement in new governance processes, even while the importance of
striving towards this goal is reinforced. While Hutter’s article references the
importance accorded to consumers as an influence on the activities of food
managers, Conley and Williams find that “[A]t almost every turn in corpo-
rate social responsibility practice, including the EPs project, someone else
speaks for the local communities that are its presumed beneficiaries” (p. 568).
As noted above, Sarra’s findings with respect to the role of employees in the
Algoma Steel restructuring were that that influence was highly contingent on
a temporary and politically supported possession of economic leverage.
Finally, responding to their concerns about the expertise-based and insular
world of enforced corporate monitorships, Ford and Hess examine the
possibilities for achieving increased public participation in the monitorship
regime.
In implementing new governance processes, the significance to be accorded
to specific bodies of “expertise” is highly contextual and situation dependent.
Here again we see several different stories. For Hutter, there is a lesson from
her research on the railway industry related to the difficulty of implementing
effective strategies for dealing with occupational health and safety problems
throughout the organization. She notes, in characterizing the experience of
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British Rail (BR) with self-regulation around these requirements as “more
procedural than substantive,” that “BR was a complex organization
comprising a diversity of professions, encompassing a variety of busi-
nesses . . . This led potentially to a great source of variation” (p. 468). Mean-
while, Bamberger and Mulligan point to the development of a new profession
of “chief privacy officer,” as well as the integration of a “network of specially
trained employees into business lines as a means of identifying and address-
ing privacy concerns,” as critical to successfully governing privacy in the
business organizations studied (p. 488). Conley and Williams also point to
the emerging role of consulting firms used to prepare environmental and
social impact assessments for those seeking loans from global banks.
Ford and Hess reflect on the poor fit between the professional expertise
of the ex-prosecutors who typically become corporate monitors, and the
expansive role intended for those monitors, especially with respect to
the ongoing development of learning about best practices that may be
gleaned from specific examples of implementation. On the other hand,
Ford and Hess remain cautious about whether a complete solution to this
problem would lie in the development of a profession of “corporate
monitor” with more organizational compliance expertise, because of the
potential for insularity, homogeneity, and lack of public accountability that
may result.
IV. MOTIVATIONS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOUR
A number of the articles speak to whether it is possible to identify factors
that motivate organizations to embed new governance processes internally.
There is some convergence evident in the Conley and Williams, Bamberger
and Mulligan, and Hutter articles, as they all reference external pressures,
whether from consumers, the public, or the idea of “reputational risk.”
Conley and Willams and Sarra also reference economic self-interest as a
driver of participation in new governance initiatives. This point bears further
examination, however, because one of the key insights of Sarra’s article is
indeed that shareholders’ self-interest with respect to debates about optimal
corporate governance has changed with the decoupling (via derivatives) of an
economic interest from the legal rights traditionally embedded in the
shareholding relationship. In other words, the economic interests of share-
holders are not static but are themselves reconstituted in the process of
negotiating corporate governance norms (Hutter, this issue; Condon 1998).
Ford and Hess find a general lack of enthusiasm among the businesses
researched to embrace the fundamental organizational changes proposed by
monitorships—thereby reinforcing their conviction that meaningful enforce-
ment matters—though, since these initiatives follow on the heels of regula-
tory enforcement processes, their organizational subjects are unlikely to be
“compliance leaders” anyway (Thornton, Gunningham, and Kagan 2005).
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This lack of enthusiasm may also in part speak to the question of “capacity”
noted by Hutter as a key predictor of the likely success of new governance
initiatives.
V. NEW GOVERNANCE AND ENFORCEMENT
Some scholars of new governance are quick to point out that the horizontal
and experimental approach they advocate will not be successful in the
absence of a rigorous enforcement regime (Ford 2005; Karkkainen 2004).
For example, Hutter insists that states are required to assess whether or not
to take drastic action against businesses that are “persistently incapable” of
managing risk. Some of the articles in this issue take on the question of what
a new governance-inspired enforcement program for regulation might look
like. As we have noted above, Ford and Hess’s article on corporate moni-
torships is an example of the kind of cultural experimentation that new
governance advocates in the enforcement sphere. Interestingly, Conley and
Williams’ article raises the issue of whether the Equator Principles analysed
therein could work as a substitute for the lack of enforcement of environ-
mental norms by particular jurisdictions. New governance engages with the
broader socio-legal debate about enforcement effectiveness by pointing to the
need for creativity and remaining sensitive to context, while acknowledging
enforcement’s continued importance in the regulatory toolkit.
CONCLUSION
A final question for an introduction that seeks to synthesize the findings of a
diverse set of articles is whether there are generalizable insights to be derived
therein. In our view, the “thick descriptions” (Geertz 1973, 6) of specific
organizational contexts that these articles provide are precisely the point.
Generalizable conclusions—in the sense of “off the rack” theoretical recom-
mendations that can be applied with minimal regard to context and
situation—do not present themselves here. This should not be a surprise at
this stage. Rather, these case studies and others like them are the context-rich
material required to develop a set of relevant questions that those involved in
new governance efforts could be considering. Taken together, these articles
reinforce a conviction that we alluded to at the beginning of this introduc-
tion: that granular stories about actual new governance efforts shed crucial
light on how programs are implemented within business organizations.
We might even imagine a provisional matrix of sorts going forward, which
tries to draw out learning from these and other accounts. Among other
elements it would consider extant context—the nature of the industry in
question (Hutter) or of an enforceable background rule of law norm (Conley
and Williams). It would demand conscious attention to the location of
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agency, the precise nature of different actors’ capacities, and power. Particu-
lar forms of expertise will be salient in particular contexts. Our provisional
matrix would therefore call for an intimate understanding of the relevant
actors—of why internal actors can be effective change agents in the Federal
Trade Commisison (FTC) privacy context, for example (Bamberger and
Mulligan); of why ex-prosecutors do not function perfectly as corporate
monitors (Ford and Hess); and of the conditions under which a broader
group of stakeholders is accorded a voice in high-stakes decisions, such as the
Algoma Steel restructuring (Sarra). Equally important would be a clear-eyed
appraisal of what particular factors, beyond the sphere of short-term self-
interest, are expected to stimulate change in a particular situation. Given the
apparently recurring problems incorporating broad, direct stakeholder par-
ticipation, new governance scholars and practitioners also have to ask them-
selves how important broad participation is to the approach (likely very
important) and whether and how the problem can be remediated in any
particular situation. The question is directly posed through these case studies
and demands a response.
Making new governance successes replicable across business organizations
requires not generality, but specificity, experimentalism, and pragmatism.
This is the kind of work called for in order to continue to deepen our
understanding of why new governance methods work when they do, what
their essential preconditions are, what considerations should be explicit in
formulating a new governance effort, and what some of the most perilous
steps may be in the translation from theory to practice.
NOTE
1. The origin of this special issue on new governance and the business organization
lies in a symposium held at The University of British Columbia in Vancouver,
Canada in May 2009, sponsored by the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council, the Law Foundation of British Columbia, and the National
Centre for Business Law at the University of British Columbia. The symposium
brought together an exciting and eclectic group of scholars from Canada, the
United States, England, and Australia, who collectively represented disciplines
such as law, business, information studies, sociology, and political science.
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financial regulation.
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456 LAW & POLICY October 2011
© 2011 The Authors
Law & Policy © 2011 The University of Denver/Colorado Seminary
REFERENCES
Ayres, Ian, and John Braithwaite. 1992. Responsive Regulation: Transcending the
Regulatory Debate. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.
Beck, Ulrich. 1992. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage
Publications.
Coglianese, Cary, and David Lazer. 2003. “Management-Based Regulation: Prescrib-
ing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals,” Law and Society Review 37:
691–730.
Condon, Mary. 1998. Making Disclosure: Ideas and Interests in Ontario Securities
Regulation 1945–1978. Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press.
---. 2007. Comparative Models of Risk-based Financial Services Research Study
Project #5. Ontario: Ontario Expert Commission.
de Búrca, Gráinne, and Joanne Scott (eds.). 2006. Law and New Governance in the EU
and the US. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
---. 2007. “Symposium, Narrowing the Gap? Law and New Approaches to Gover-
nance in the European Union,” Columbia Journal of European Law 13: 513–731.
Dorf, Michael C., and Charles F. Sabel. 1998. “A Constitution of Democratic Experi-
mentalism,” Columbia Law Review 98: 267–473.
Freeman, Jody. 1997. “Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State,”
UCLA Law Review 45: 1–98.
Ford, Cristie. 2005. “Toward a New Model for Securities Law Enforcement,” Admin-
istrative Law Review 57: 757–828.
---. 2008. “New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities Regula-
tion,” American Business Law Journal 45: 1–60.
Geertz, Clifford. 1973. The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays. New York:
Basic Books.
Gilad, Sharon. 2010. “It Runs in the Family: Meta-Regulation and Its Siblings,”
Regulation & Governance 4: 485–506.
Grabosky, Peter. 1995. “Using Non-Governmental Resources to Foster Regulatory
Compliance,” Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 8:
527–550.
Huising, Ruthanne, and Susan Silbey. 2009. “Governing the Gap: Forging Safe
Science through a Community of Practice,” Regulation and Governance 5: 14–42.
Karkkainen, Bradley C. 2004. “ ‘New Governance’ in Legal Thought and in the
World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping,” Minnesota Law
Review 89: 471–97.
Levi-Faur, David. 2005. “The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism,” The
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 598: 12–32.
---. 2009. “Regulatory Capitalism and the Reassertion of the Public Interest,” Policy
and Society 27: 181–91.
Lobel, Orly. 2004. “The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Gov-
ernance in Contemporary Legal Thought,” Minnesota Law Review 89: 342–470.
Meidinger, Errol. 2006. “The Administrative Law of Global Private-Public Regula-
tion: The Case of Forestry,” European Journal of International Law 17: 47–87.
Parker, Christine. 2002. The Open Corporation. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
---. 2009. “Negotiating Enforcement and Sanctioning in Regulatory Capitalism: The
Need for Problem-Solving Courts,” December 23. http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1527317 (accessed on June 30, 2011).
Power, Michael. 2007. Organized Uncertainty: Designing a World of Risk Manage-
ment. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
Sabel, Charles F., and William H. Simon. 2004. “Destabilization Rights: How Public
Law Litigation Succeeds,” Harvard Law Review 117: 1015–1101.
Ford and Condon SPECIAL ISSUE OF LAW AND POLICY 457
© 2011 The Authors
Law & Policy © 2011 The University of Denver/Colorado Seminary
Shearing, Clifford D. 1993. “A Constitutive Conception of Regulation.” In Business
Regulation and Australia’s Future, edited by Peter N. Grabosky and Jonathan
Braithwaite, 67–79. Canberra, Australia: Australian Institute of Criminology.
Shearing, Clifford D., and Jonathan Wood. 2003. “Nodal Governance, Democracy
and the New ‘Denizens’: Challenging the Westphalian Ideal,” Journal of Law and
Society 20: 400–19.
Sparrow, Malcolm. 2000. The Regulatory Craft: Controlling Risks, Solving Problems,
and Managing Compliance. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Thornton, Dorothy, Neil Gunningham, and Robert A. Kagan. 2005. “General Deter-
rence and Corporate Environmental Behavior,” Law and Policy 27: 262–88.
Wisconsin Law Review. 2010. “Symposium: New Governance and the Transforma-
tion of Law,” Wisconsin Law Review 2010 (2): 227–748.
458 LAW & POLICY October 2011
© 2011 The Authors
Law & Policy © 2011 The University of Denver/Colorado Seminary
